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The Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal
Criminal Investigations
A report prepared by the American College of Trial Lawyers*
INTRODUCTION
Federal prosecutors increasingly rely on counsel for the defense
to build the government's case by insisting that the individual or
corporate defendant waive the attorney-client privilege and turn
over both client-lawyer communications and the work product of
the lawyer. This provides prosecutors at the outset of an investi-
gation with information defense counsel has obtained from their
client, as well as with defense counsel's factual and legal analysis.
In previous years, federal prosecutors were more likely to rely pri-
marily on their own investigation of the facts and seek a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege only rarely and then in very limited
circumstances.
Today, federal prosecutors are able to obtain waivers of the at-
torney-client privilege and work product protections both by
threatening to prosecute and by seeking more serious charges or
sanctions if such cooperation is not provided. After the govern-
ment has selected the crimes to be charged and obtained a convic-
tion, courts must impose the sentence for that level crime pre-
scribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, prose-
cutors are able to exert a great measure of control over both the
charging and sentencing process, thus requiring that defense
counsel take into account the often harsh effect of the Sentencing
Guidelines before responding to a federal prosecutor's request for
* The American College of Trial Lawyers is a professional organization composed of
the best of the trial bar from the United States and Canada. Fellowship in the College is by
invitation, extended only after careful investigation, to those experienced trial lawyers who
have demonstrated exceptional skill as advocates and whose professional careers have been
marked by the highest standards of ethical conduct, professionalism and civility. Fellows
are carefully selected from among those who represent plaintiffs and defendants in civil
cases and from those who prosecute and defend persons from a crime. This article is the
joint product of three committees of the American College of Trial Lawyers: (1) Committee
on Federal Rules of Evidence; (2) Committee on Attorney-Client Relationships; and (3)
Committee on Federal Criminal Procedure. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein
are solely those of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
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a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product protec-
tions.
In seeking a waiver of the attorney-client or work product privi-
lege, the government's demands change the very nature of the
criminal justice system as well as the adversary process. These
demands, which erode the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine, commonly include not only waiver of these pro-
tections, but also disclosure of corporate internal investigations by
counsel, discouragement of payment by the corporation for counsel
for individual employees whom the government prosecutor be-
lieves are culpable and requests that information regarding the
nature of the government's investigation not be relayed to other
suspects through joint defense agreements. This government ap-
proach has been likened to the sound of "a requiem marking the
death of privilege in corporate criminal investigations."'
Inherent in this approach is that the prosecutor's initial view of
the case must be accepted as fact and not be opposed by counsel
for the individual or the corporation; to do so is to act at the cli-
ent's peril. This approach has recently become more widespread,
if not universal, by embodiment in the United States Department
of Justice ("Justice Department") standards for the federal prose-
cution of corporations.2 Initially circulated as an internal memo-
randum by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in June of
1999, these standards are applied to individuals as well as corpo-
rations.3
The Holder Memo Standards encourage federal prosecutors to
seek waivers of the attorney-client and work product privilege.
They state that, when weighing whether the corporation has suffi-
ciently cooperated in the investigation phase so as to not be
1. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147
(2000).
2. U.S. ATToRNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, Federal
Prosecutions of Corporations (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading-room/usam/title9/crmO0162.htm, [hereinaf-
ter "Criminal Resource Manual"]; see also Jonathan D. Polkes & Renee L. Jarusinsky,
Waiver of Corporate Privileges in a Government Investigation: Reaction to the New DOJ
Policy, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2001 J-31, J-31 to J-33 (ABA 2001).
3. See generally Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, to All
Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (including attach-
ment entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations"), reprinted in Criminal Resource Man-
ual, arts. 161, 162, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmOO10O.htm. The at-
tachment to the Holder Memo will be hereinafter referred to as the "Holder Memo Stan-
dards."
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charged with a crime, the prosecutor may consider whether the
corporation has identified culprits, turned over its internal inves-
tigation and waived the attorney-client and work product protec-
tions. The Holder Memo Standards provide:
In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the
prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to iden-
tify the culprits within the corporation, including senior ex-
ecutives, to make witnesses available, to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation, and to waive the attorney-
client and work product privileges.4
The Holder Memo Standards do emphasize that such a waiver is
not an absolute requirement, but merely one factor the govern-
ment should consider in evaluating the corporation's cooperation.5
For example, the Holder Memo Standards note that:
This waiver should ordinarily be limited to the factual inter-
nal investigation and any contemporaneous advice given to
the corporation concerning the conduct at issue. Except in
unusual circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a waiver
with respect to communications and work product related to
advice concerning the government's criminal investigation.6
Yet, it is difficult to see or to make this distinction, which is, in
any event, left to the sole discretion of the prosecutor.
The Holder Memo Standards also suggest that providing coun-
sel for corporate officers, directors or employees7 and entering into
joint defense agreements may indicate a corporation's lack of co-
operation; i.e., the company that engages in these practices is
more likely to be indicted than the company that avoids them.
Indeed, the Holder Memo Standards provide:
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees
and agents. Thus, while cases will differ depending on the
4. Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, § VI.A.
5. Id. § VI.B.
6. Id. §V.Bn.2.
7. The Holder Memo Standards do recognize in a footnote that "[s]ome states require
corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to a formal determi-
nation of their guilt. Obviously, a corporation's compliance with governing law should not
be considered a failure to cooperate." Id. § VI.B n.3.
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circumstances, a corporation's promise of support to culpable
employees and agents, either through the advancing of attor-
neys fees, through retaining the employees without sanction
for their misconduct, or through providing information to the
employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a
joint defense agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor
in weighing the extent and value of a corporation's coopera-
tion.'
In addition to the policies expressed in the Holder Memo Stan-
dards, the federal government has further undermined the attor-
ney-client privilege and work product doctrine by increasingly at-
tacking the existence of these protections in ex parte proceedings,
asserting that the crime-fraud exception vitiates any privilege.9
In these situations, the defendant or person under investigation
has no opportunity to be heard and the government need make
only a prima facie showing. As a result, courts often adopt the
government's view of the available facts and defense counsel may
be required to testify against his or her client on short notice if the
court finds that the crime-fraud exception applies.
The College is concerned that these government policies under-
mine and erode the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine to an alarming extent and change the balance in the ad-
versary system from one in which opposite points of view may be
pursued by opposing counsel to a system in which the federal
prosecutor's view can be challenged only at great peril, thereby
reducing the ability of defense counsel in a criminal investigation
to provide effective assistance to his or her client.'"
8. Id. § VI.B (footnote omitted).
9. Under this exception, a client who seeks assistance from counsel for the purpose of
committing a crime or fraud is not entitled to the protections of confidentiality. Indeed,
"[t]he privilege ends when the client seeks to involve the attorney in wrongdoing." David J.
Fried, Too High A Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1986) (tracing the history of
the exception, discussing its rationale, and reviewing its expansion).
10. In addition to the concerns expressed in this Report, the College also notes that it
recently submitted comments to the Bureau of Prisons, the Attorney General and the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, regarding the interim rule and amendments to the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations that became effective on October 30, 2001, and that authorize the monitor-
ing and recording of communications and meetings between inmates and counsel. See
generally Letter from Stuart D. Shanor, President, American College of Trial Lawyers, to
Rules Unit, Office of General Counsel, Bureau of Prisons, (Dec. 21, 2001) (on file with the
College). These comments stated that, despite the College's support of our government's
ongoing efforts to eliminate terrorism, the monitoring authorized in the amendments:
[W]ill have a chilling effect, inhibit the free exchange between defendant and lawyer
and is therefore (i) a threat to the effective assistance of counsel at a time when a de-
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I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE
A. Origin and Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The Federal Rules of Evidence have adopted the attorney-client
privilege as it existed at common law. Rule 501 states that "the
privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience."1 As recog-
nized by Wigmore in his comprehensive and oft-cited work setting
forth the history of the attorney-client privilege, this privilege is
"the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications."
12
The earliest reported cases recognizing the privilege date as far
back as the early part of the reign of Elizabeth I." The attorney-
client privilege is likely not reported prior to this era because the
testimony of witnesses and defendants was not a common source
of proof at trial and, in general, testimonial compulsion had not
been previously authorized. 4
Although modern federal courts tend to apply the attorney-
client privilege narrowly, the elements for establishing the privi-
lege reflect the basic contours of the privilege since its establish-
ment in England. In the seminal case of United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., Judge Wyzanski first pronounced that the
privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
fendant who is being held for trial has a constitutional right to competent and effec-
tive counsel and (ii) an unwarranted intrusion on the attorney-client privilege of both
individuals awaiting trail and of unindicted detainees.
The College refers to these comments for a complete statement of the College's views on the
monitoring issue.
11. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(citing this rule with approval).
12. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542
(McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter "WIGMORE"]; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389;
WIGMORE, supra, at 542 n.1 (citing, for example, Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33
(Ch. 1577), and Dennis v. Codrington, Cary 143, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580)).
13. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 542 n.1 (collecting cases from the late 1500s to
the 1600s and indicating that the privilege first appeared as unquestioned in these cases);
see also 1 CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 343-44 (John
William Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter "MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE"].
14. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 542-43 (noting that the privilege "appears to
have commended itself at the very outset as a natural exception to the then novel right of
testimonial compulsion").
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(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a law-
yer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the at-
torney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of commit-
ting a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client. 5
The United Shoe rule essentially remains the prevailing law as it
relates to the attorney-client privilege when applied by federal
courts.
16
Thus, for centuries in English and American law, the attorney-
client privilege has been firmly grounded in the recognition that
legal consultation serves the public interest.7 Federal common
law in the United States has long embraced this justification, 8 in
both a criminal and civil law context. Indeed, the application of
the privilege to criminal as well as to civil cases has been largely
unquestioned. 9 Moreover, the privilege is generally considered
15. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); see also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn
Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 449 (1982)
(indicating that the United Shoe court was the first federal court to discuss the corporate
attorney-client privilege at length); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 149 n.9 (indicating
that the United Shoe rule is one of the most inclusive recitations of the elements of the
attorney-client privilege).
16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 520 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000); Mont-
gomery County v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Fed. Grand Jury
Proceedings 89-10(MIA), 938 F.2d 1578, 1581 (11th Cir. 1991); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d
94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601-02 (8th
Cir. 1977). The only part of United Shoe that has been called into question is the applica-
tion of the rule to patent matters. See, e.g., Am. Standard v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745-
46 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Woods v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.N.J. 1993).
17. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 545-49 (quoting decisions from the
1700s and 1800s that expound on the importance of the privilege).
18. See, e.g., Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833) ("[S]o numerous
and complex are the laws ... , so important is it that [citizens] should be permitted to avail
themselves of the superior skill and learning of those who are sanctioned by the law as its
ministers and expounders .... that the law has considered it the wisest policy to encourage
and sanction this confidence [between client and attorney], by requiring that on such facts
the mouth of the attorney shall be for ever sealed."); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that the privilege encourages "full and frank commu-
nication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] broader public inter-
ests in the observance of law and administration of justice" and acknowledging that the
"rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the [Supreme] Court"); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege is necessary "in the interest
and administration ofjustice").
19. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1998) (rejecting
any effort to apply the attorney-client privilege differently in criminal cases); Schwimmer v.
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absolute unless waived by the client." As such, today, the "attor-
ney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the modern
American lawyer's professional functions."2
B. Origin and Purpose of the Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine, like the attorney-client privilege, de-
rives from common law origins. As a leading commentator has
explained:
The natural jealousy of the lawyer for the privacy of his file,
and the courts' desire to protect the effectiveness of the law-
yer's work as the manager of litigation, have found expres-
sion, not only as we have seen in the evidential privilege for
confidential lawyer-client communications, but in rules and
practices about the various forms of pretrial discovery. Thus,
under the chancery practice of discovery, the adversary was
not required to disclose, apart from his own testimony, the
evidence which he would use, or the names of the witnesses
he would call in support of his own case. The same restriction
has often been embodied in, or read into, the statutory discov-
22ery systems.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863-66 (8th Cir. 1956) (assuming without discussion that the
attorney-client privilege applied in a criminal case); Gunther v. United States, 230 F.2d
222, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (same).
20. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d. 1414, 1429
(3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that the attorney-client privilege affords "absolute protection" and
discussing waiver standards).
21. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (stating that the privilege "is considered indispensable to
the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the advocate can adequately prepare a
case only if the client is free to disclose everything," and that a "legal counselor can prop-
erly advise the client what to do only if the client is free to make full disclosure").
In fact, the Justice Department itself recognizes the value and usefulness of the attorney-
client privilege with respect to its representation of federal employees. In the Justice De-
partment's codified statement of policy, it states that:
Attorneys employed by any component of the Department of Justice... undertake a
full and traditional attorney-client relationship with the employee with respect to
application of the attorney-client privilege .... Any adverse information communi-
cated by the client-employee to an attorney during the course of such attorney-client
relationship shall not be disclosed to anyone, either inside or outside the Department,
other than attorneys responsible for representation of the employee, unless such dis-
closure is authorized by the employee.
28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3) (2000).
22. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 201-02 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 844
(8th Cir. 1973).
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At common law, the privilege was much broader than its mod-
ern day analog: a document in the hands of the attorney, even if it
did not come into existence as a communication to the attorney,
would have been exempt from production." The modern work
product doctrine is more narrowly tailored and traces back to the
Supreme Court's decision of more than half a century ago in
Hickman v. Taylor.4 As articulated by the Court, the work prod-
uct doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client
privilege: "[W]ritten statements, private memoranda and per-
sonal recollections prepared or formed by an [attorney] in the
course of his legal duties," and with an eye toward litigation, are
not discoverable, as "[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions . . . on wits borrowed
from the adversary."25 The work product doctrine, however, unlike
the attorney-client privilege, is not absolute and can be overcome
if a party seeking discovery shows that "relevant and non-
privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where
production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's
case."
26
The Court in Hickman explained that the doctrine serves both a
public and a private purpose. With respect to the former, the
work product doctrine directly promotes the adversary system by
enabling attorneys to prepare their cases without fear that their
work product will be used against their clients.2 ' At the same
time, it also serves a private purpose by affording an attorney "a
certain degree of privacy" so as to discourage "unfairness" and
"sharp practices." 8 These same policies remain vital today. The
rule first pronounced in Hickman has been codified in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2), (b)(2) and in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).
In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, which may be as-
serted only by the client, either the attorney or the client usually
23. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2318, at 620-21 & n.3 (collecting extensive list of
cases from nineteenth century English courts).
24. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court dealt with two forms of work
product: written statements from witnesses interviewed by defense counsel and the con-
tents of oral interviews with witnesses, some of which had been summarized in memoranda
prepared by the defense lawyers. The court reasoned that the protection for the latter
category, often referred to as "opinion" product, exceeded that of the former. Id. at 512-13.
25. Id. at 510 (Murphy, J.), 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id. at 510-11.
28. Id.
Vol. 41314
Winter 2003 Atty. Client Priv. and Work Product Doctrine 315
may invoke the work product doctrine.29 Courts have recognized
that "the interests of attorneys and those of their clients may not
always be the same. To the extent that the interests do not con-
flict, attorneys should be entitled to claim [work product] privilege
even if their clients have relinquished their claims." 0 The ability
of the lawyer to claim the privilege has been broadly construed by
the courts. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has held that a lawyer had the right to assert the privi-
lege for work product materials even where the attorney was con-
sulted in furtherance of the client's fraud, at least to the extent
that the lawyer was unaware of the fraud.3
C. The Joint Defense Privilege
The joint defense privilege, first recognized in Chahoon v.
Commonwealth,32 enables multiple parties to share information
protected by the attorney-client privilege without waiving the
privilege, where the parties "have common interests in defending
against a pending or anticipated proceeding."33 This privilege,
however, is not an independent privilege; it is only an extension of
the attorney-client privilege and acts as an exception to the gen-
eral rule that the privilege is waived when privileged information
is shared with a third party.34
Accordingly, courts have generally recognized that this privi-
lege, also known as the "common interest rule," protects "the con-
fidentiality of communications passing from one party to the at-
torney for another party where a joint defense effort or strategy
29. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (indicating that
work product privilege belongs to the lawyer as well as the client); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceeding (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (allowing an attorney to invoke the doc-
trine).
30. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809 n.56 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC
Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Supreme Court has identified several inter-
related interests that the work product doctrine seeks to protect, ranging from a client's
interest in obtaining sound legal advice to the interests attorneys have in protecting their
own intellectual product. Id. (discussing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511).
31. Id. at 812 & n.75 (citing FMC Corp., 604 F.2d at 801 n.4, 802 n.5).
32. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
33. John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Protecting Privilege and Dealing Fairly with Em-
ployees While Conducting an Internal Investigation, 1178 PLI/CORP 665, 719 (2000); see
also Michael J. Chepiga, Federal Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, 653
PLI/LIT 519, 589 (2001); Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doc-
trine, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1996).
34. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Waller v. Fin.
Corp. of Arm, 828 F.2d 579, 583 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).
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has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their
respective counsel.""
D. Balancing the Unavailability of Evidence Against Need for the
Privilege
The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine fre-
quently operate to deny powerful evidence to the opposition, i.e.,
the defendant's very own statement of the case against him. Our
courts, however, have consistently found that "[t]he systemic bene-
fits of the privilege are commonly understood to outweigh the
harm caused by excluding critical evidence."36 Federal courts have
supported the need for these protections on public policy grounds
and have repeatedly recognized that the attorney-client privilege
advances the administration of justice, as a "'public good tran-
scending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all ra-
tional means for ascertaining truth."'' 7 As the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has stated, "[t]his valuable social service of
counseling clients and bringing them into compliance with the law
cannot be performed effectively if clients are scared to tell their
lawyers what they are doing, for fear that their lawyers will be
turned into government informants."38 In similar terms, the Su-
preme Court has observed that the work product doctrine serves
"the cause of justice" by preventing "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices."9
Any perceived harm to the fact-finding process attributable to
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine may be
exaggerated because, without these protections, clients may well
choose not to disclose sensitive information to their attorneys, and
35. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243; see also United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-
261, 1992 WL 693384, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) ("[D]efendants with common inter-
ests in multi-defendant actions are entitled to share information protected by the attorney-
client privilege without danger that the privilege will be waived by disclosure to a third
person.").
36. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 412 (1998) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); see also Sampson Fire Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 356 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
37. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1, 9 (1996).
38. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996).
39. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); see also United States v. Noble, 422
U.S. 225, 236-38 (1975).
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lawyers may not commit their thoughts and analysis to paper in
the first instance.0
E. The Privilege and Corporations
It is well established that the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine may be asserted by corporations, as well as by
natural persons.4' The attorney-client privilege protects confiden-
tial communications between the attorney and anyone within the
corporate structure - directors, officers, as well as middle and
lower-level employees - whose duties relate to the issues upon
which the attorney is asked to provide legal assistance and who
has information that the attorney would need to render adequate
legal advice.42 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the ar-
gument that the privilege should cover only those in the corporate
control group (i.e., the directors and officers of the corporation),
because such a view ignores the fact that "the privilege exists to
protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can
act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice. ""
F. Special Need for the Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Prod-
uct Privilege
A corporation faced with evidence or allegations of illegal behav-
ior will generally conduct an internal investigation to determine
the scope of wrongdoing and the extent of its potential liability.
Typically, the corporation will retain outside counsel who will in-
terview employees, prepare notes of interviews, review documents
(privileged and otherwise), create a chronology of events and write
client memos. Counsel may also prepare a written report of such
an inquiry including conclusions and recommendations, but this is
not always the case. To accomplish these tasks, the investigating
attorney must induce cooperation from numerous employees who,
for various reasons, may not wish to cooperate. In a properly con-
ducted investigation, the employees are informed at the outset
that communications with counsel for the corporation are not
40. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (noting that were privileged materials open to the opposi-
tion on demand, "much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten").
41. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-95 (1981) (allowing a corpora-
tion to invoke the privilege).
42. Id. at 391-92.
43. Id. at 390.
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privileged as to the employee; that is, the company lawyer is not
the employee's lawyer, and the corporation is free to disclose such
communications without the consent of the employee." Nonethe-
less, corporate employees and officers are generally more willing
to cooperate where they receive a measure of assurance that their
conversations with counsel will not be divulged to government in-
vestigators or prosecutors. 45 An internal investigation would be
far less useful, and its demoralizing effect on employees would be
far greater, if the investigator's sole means of inducing cooperation
was the threat of discipline or termination of employment, rather
than the protection of confidentiality."
In short, by facilitating internal investigations, the corporate at-
torney-client privilege and work product doctrine advance the ad-
ministration of justice by enabling the corporation to gather the
information necessary to understand the relevant issues, to re-
ceive competent legal advice, to identify culpable employees, to
determine its own liability, to change existing or institute new
compliance programs and, finally, to fully cooperate with the gov-
ernment. It is important to note that information and documents
may be provided to the government to assist it in conducting its
investigation and to others without divulging such specific privi-
leged communications.
II. REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT ENCROACHMENT ON THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Waiver of the Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege
When a corporation has learned - whether through receipt of a
grand jury subpoena, self-reporting by employees or internal
monitoring under a corporate compliance program - that its em-
ployees may have acted illegally and an internal investigation has
begun, the corporation generally expects that communications
with its lawyers and their investigators and documents produced
at their request will be protected by the attorney-client privilege
and/or the work product doctrine. Unfortunately, in light of the
44. Despite this caution, many employees as a practical matter consider the corpora-
tion's lawyers to be their lawyers and are otherwise hesitant for job security reasons not to
answer their questions.
45. Judson W. Starr and Joshua N. Schopf, Cooperating with the Government's Investi-
gation: The New Dilemma, SE72 ALI-ABA 353, 360-61 (2000).
46. Id. at 361.
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recent practices and policy statements by the Justice Department,
particularly those set forth in the Holder Memo Standards, this
assumption is no longer tenable.
The Justice Department's policy, as expressed in the Holder
Memo Standards, is to obtain waivers of the corporate attorney-
client and work product privilege where, in the government's view,
these protections might keep information relevant to a criminal
investigation from discovery. Indeed, there is no pretense that the
values underlying these privileges are to be sacrificed for any rea-
son other than to make the prosecution's job easier: "Such waivers
permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual coop-
eration or immunity agreements." 7 The obvious alternative, not
widely favored by government prosecutors, is to conduct a factual
investigation by taking statements and obtaining documents from
a corporation and its employers, yet without insisting on also ob-
taining privileged statements made to counsel and attorney work
product. It is not inconsistent with preserving the attorney-client
privilege and work product protections for a company to provide
information and documents to aid the government, since the privi-
lege goes to the specific communication with the client and not
necessarily to the information and documents obtained during the
course of an internal investigation.
The Holder Memo Standards, now incorporated into the United
States Attorneys' Manual's Criminal Resource Manual, provide a
blueprint for maximizing the government's leverage to induce
waivers of the corporate attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct doctrine. For example, one source of leverage arises from the
possibility that the prosecutor may enter into a non-prosecution
agreement with a corporate target. The Criminal Resource Man-
ual authorizes prosecutors to offer not to indict a corporation
where its "timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public
interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are
unavailable or would not be effective." 8 Furthermore, in deter-
mining whether a non-prosecution agreement would be appropri-
ate, prosecutors are instructed to consider the "completeness" of
the corporation's disclosure, including whether the corporation
granted "a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protec-
tions, both with respect to its internal investigation and with re-
47. Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, § VI.B.
48. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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spect to communications between specific officers, directors, and
employees and counsel."49 Although the Holder Memo Standards
do not consider a waiver as an "absolute requirement," they still
authorize and even encourage prosecutors to "request a waiver in
appropriate circumstances."" Fluid and ambiguous terms such as
"necessary," "necessary to the public interest" and "appropriate
circumstances" are left to the sole discretion of the government
and generally to the individual prosecutor.
Another source of leverage that the government enjoys is its
control over the sentencing decision. At the outset, the govern-
ment selects the crime to be charged and the Sentencing Guide-
lines set forth the appropriate sentence range for such charge from
which the court generally may not depart. The Sentencing Guide-
lines also give credit to corporations that have engaged in self-
reporting, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility for pur-
poses of calculating the corporation's "culpability score."51 To qual-
ify for this credit, "cooperation must be both timely and thor-
ough." 2 According to the Sentencing Guidelines, "timeliness"
means cooperation must begin "essentially at the same time as the
organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation," while
"thoroughness" requires "the disclosure of all pertinent informa-
tion known by the organization."" Although courts ultimately de-
cide what sentence must be imposed under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the government's recommendation, based on its assessment
of whether a corporation has cooperated in a "timely," "thorough,"
and complete manner, has tremendous influence on the ultimate
sentence.54 Similarly, the government can materially affect the
sentencing decision by favorably or unfavorably calculating either
the amount of pecuniary gain to the corporation or the pecuniary
loss from the offense caused by the corporation.55
With regard to the government's raw power implicit under the
Sentencing Guidelines, the government is often not willing to
make a binding non-prosecution commitment without a reciprocal
commitment from a defendant, oftentimes seeking in exchange a
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2001) [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."].
52. Id., cmt. 12.
53. Id.
54. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 154-55.
55. See id.
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full and complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine. Yet, as commentators have queried:
Do such demands ultimately benefit the cause of justice? Are
the costs of coercing companies to waive the attorney-client
privilege worth the short-term gains in the immediate case?
The long-term damage inflicted on both corporate and societal
interests by the government's emerging coercive waiver policy
far outweighs any short-term utility.
6
If the government, however, demands a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and, more specifically, the protections for counsel's
work product, the corporation is forced to make a classic Hobson's
choice. It either gives in to the government's demand, thereby
sending a message to its employees that they should not cooperate
in future internal investigations, or rejects the government's con-
ditions and risks indictment and conviction. The chilling effect on
corporate self-scrutiny is obvious and there will be a serious ad-
verse impact on the ability of corporations to prevent the occur-
rence of future violations of law, and of counsel to conduct mean-
ingful and effective internal investigations. Furthermore, this
practice serves to drive a harmful wedge between employees and
the corporation.
While individual prosecutors may advance a particular case
more quickly and effectively under the Holder Memo Standards,
the Justice Department's waiver policy is indefensible from a sys-
temic perspective. First, the waiver policy is ultimately counter-
productive to the Justice Department's stated objective of obtain-
ing "critical" assistance from the corporation "in identifying the
culprits and locating relevant evidence."57 As a result of this pol-
icy, outside counsel for a corporation now commences an internal
investigation with the knowledge that the statements taken by the
lawyer will likely be sought by and turned over to the prosecution
and that the lawyer may be called as a witness. The likelihood of
this occurring -and fairness to a company's employees dictates
that they be so advised before their interviews - has the dual ef-
fect of chilling the inquiry from the outset and of eroding trust
between management and staff.58 Moreover, it can only complicate
the task of detecting and preventing future wrongdoing.
56. Starr and Schopf, supra note 45, at 356.
57. Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, § VI.B.
58. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 157.
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Indeed, it has been suggested that today, in response to current
Justice Department pressure on corporations to waive the protec-
tions of the work product doctrine, counsel often anticipate at the
outset of an investigation that "the fruits of the investigation
stand a substantial chance of being delivered to the government,"
and that this may, again, have a chilling effect on the investiga-
tive process.59 As a result, counsel may simply refrain from put-
ting inculpatory information in written form.
Second, the waiver policy also undermines our adversarial legal
system. When a company decides to waive its privileges, "the role
of the criminal counsel is repositioned from that of the client's con-
fidential legal advisor and the government's adversary into a con-
duit of information between the client and the government."'
Contrary to the Hickman Court's admonition, the prosecution
then performs its duties "on wits borrowed from the adversary."'
Moreover, counsel for the company is forced to become a witness
against it and its employees, stripping both of their counsel of
choice and generally impairing the client's trust in the lawyer.
Third, the government's approach, as expressed in the Holder
Memo Standards, may enable federal prosecutors to circumvent
employees' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
This risk tends to be greatest when the government agrees to de-
fer its investigation pending completion of the corporation's inter-
nal inquiry. Under such circumstances, the government defers
with the knowledge that an employee speaking with the corpora-
tion's lawyers is less likely to retain separate counsel who, pre-
sumably, would advise the employee to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination." As a result, the em-
ployee is lured into a false sense of security and speaks more
freely than perhaps is wise. If, under pressure to demonstrate
"complete" cooperation in pursuit of its own interest, the company
subsequently decides to reveal the substance of the employee's
interview, the government may gain a significant advantage in
obtaining incriminating evidence from an employee without hav-
ing to negotiate immunity or plea agreements.63 Furthermore,
counsel for the corporation could eventually be disqualified if
called as a witness by the prosecution to impeach testimony given
59. Id. at 156.
60. Id. at 156-57.
61. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 157.
63. See Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, § VI.B.
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by one of the interviewed employees. Of course, in rare cases, call-
ing the lawyer as a witness could also be used as a tactical tool by
the prosecution to rid the corporation of the counsel of its choice.
Finally, the timing of a corporation's decision to affect a waiver
of the protections may also exacerbate the waiver's detrimental
impact on the case. A premature waiver may result in the corpo-
ration being "deprived of legal advice based on counsel's full devel-
opment of the facts and an assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the government's case."64 Again, because disclosure of an
internal investigation to the government by a corporation waives
the protections of the attorney-client and work product privilege,
the corporation may be subjected to additional litigation regarding
what information must be turned over to the government. 5
In most complicated government criminal investigations, there
are parallel proceedings upon which the government's conduct
also has an impact. These include civil cases against the company
and individuals as well as various civil enforcement proceedings
brought by federal or state agencies. If the company has waived
the attorney client privilege in the criminal investigation, it is
likely to be found to have waived the privilege in these proceed-
ings as well.
Although the current United States Attorneys' Manual recog-
nizes the value of the attorney-client privilege and seeks to pro-
vide some protection and balance before the government may in-
vade it, these provisions seem now to be either outdated or in-
creasingly ignored. For example, the United States Attorneys'
Manual states:
Department of Justice attorneys should recognize that com-
munications with represented persons at any stage may pre-
sent the potential for undue interference with attorney-client
relationships and should undertake any such communications
with great circumspection and care. This Department as a
matter of policy will respect bona fide attorney-client relation-
ships whenever possible, consistent with its law enforcement
responsibilities and duties.66
64. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 157.
65. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d. 1414, 1418
(3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that disclosure of internal investigation report to the SEC and the
Justice Department constituted waiver of both protections).
66. U.S. ArORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, § 9-13.200, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading roomusamltitle9/13mcrm.htm#9-13.200.
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Another section of the United States Attorneys' Manual provides:
In considering a request to approve the issuance of a sub-
poena to an attorney for information relating to the represen-
tation of a client, the Assistant Attorney General heading the
Criminal Division applies the following principles:
* The information shall not be protected by a valid claim of
privilege.
* All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from al-
ternative sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful.
* In a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been or is be-
ing committed, and that the information sought is reasonably
needed for the successful completion of the investigation or
prosecution.
e The need for the information must outweigh the potential
adverse effects upon the attorney-client relationship."
These expressions of support for the value of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, however, are belied by
the current Justice Department practices and guidelines and ap-
pear to be in conflict with the Holder Memo Standards.
B. Joint Defense Agreements
In addition to government pressure to waive the protections of
the attorney-client and the work product privilege, lawyers repre-
senting clients in corporate criminal matters today encounter fed-
eral prosecutors who view joint defense agreements with suspicion
and sometimes even as improper or illegal, even though such
agreements have long been recognized in the law as appropriate
and necessary to the function of providing adequate legal advice.
The sharing of information by co-defendants under the joint de-
fense privilege can greatly assist counsel in their efforts to repre-
sent their clients while offering substantial benefits to the agree-
ment's participants.8 Indeed, lawyers increasingly seek to enter
67. Id. § 9-13.410C, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading_room/usam/title9/13mcrm.htm#9-13.410.
68. Bartel, supra note 33, at 879.
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into formal joint defense agreements with another party's counsel
which set forth the applicability and scope of the privilege prior to
the sharing of any otherwise privileged information.69
An attorney seeking to invoke the joint defense privilege on be-
half of a client must be aware that the definition and scope of the
privilege, as well as factors relevant to its existence, differ mark-
edly among the Circuits. For instance, while a defendant in the
Ninth Circuit need only point to a "common interest" between
himself and a co-defendant in order to assert the privilege,"0 that
same defendant in the Third Circuit must demonstrate that the
communications he seeks to protect arose from an "on-going and
joint effort to set up a common defense strategy."" These differ-
ences between the Circuits can have a profound impact on
whether or not a client can successfully invoke the privilege.
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third and Tenth
Circuits have set rigid standards for invoking the joint defense
privilege. The law in these Circuits requires evidence of common
defense strategy between parties before allowing the privilege to
be invoked. 2 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
69. Under certain circumstances, disqualification issues may arise when a joint defense
agreement exists. Indeed, seeking disqualification is one method by which the government
may seek to attack a joint defense agreement. Several commentators discuss this matter in
greater detail. See, e.g., Chepiga, supra note 33, at 593 (indicating that although the gov-
ernment has moved in several criminal cases to disqualify an attorney who represented one
party to a joint defense agreement after another party became a witness for the prosecu-
tion, courts have routinely rejected these motions) (citing United States v. Anderson, 790 F.
Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992), and United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21445, at *17-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)); Arnold Rochvarg, Joint Defense
Agreements and Disqualification of Co-Defendant's Counsel, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311
(1998) (reviewing and analyzing cases dealing with joint defense agreements and disquali-
fication); A. Howard Matz, Lawyers on the Attack: Prosecutors' and Defense Lawyers' Ef-
forts to Curb the Other Side's Perceived Misconduct, 161 PLI/CRIM 177, 181-90 (1991) (dis-
cussing attempts to disqualify counsel, potential conflicts of interest and measures to avoid
disqualification).
70. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).
71. Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgt Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787 (3d Cir. 1985)).
72. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y 1975)). Moreover, the communications must be made in confidence to
further the joint defense effort. Id. The party must also present concrete evidence of an
actual agreement between the parties to adopt a joint defense strategy. Id. See also Grand
Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1043 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that fail-
ure to "produce any evidence, express or implied, of a joint defense agreement" precluded
application of the joint defense privilege to documents); United States v. Bay St. Ambu-
lance and Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1989) (adopting the Bevill test
and finding that while the parties at issue had "many interests in common," a particular
document was not covered by the joint defense privilege because there was no evidence that
it related to the joint defense).
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has held that "only those communications made in the course of
an ongoing common enterprise and intended to further the enter-
prise are protected."
1 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also espouses a
more limited scope for the joint defense privilege. Although the
court has stated in one case that, "persons who share a common
interest in litigation should be able to communicate with their re-
spective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prose-
cute or defend their claims,"74 the facts of that case actually sug-
gest a narrower holding. Specifically, the parties were engaged in
a joint effort to prosecute a claim and had documented their coop-
eration in a written agreement."
Arguably, the Circuit most vigorous in protecting otherwise
privileged communications divulged to third parties is the Ninth
Circuit." The Court has stated that the comrh on interest excep-
tion was "not limited ... to situations where codefendants share a
common defense or have interests that are not adverse."77 The
Ninth Circuit has also indicated that the criterion for invoking a
joint defense privilege is not whether the meeting was called to
prepare trial strategy, stating:
[W]here two or more persons who are subject to possible in-
dictment in connection with the same transactions make con-
fidential statements to their attorneys, these statements,
even though they are exchanged between attorneys, should be
privileged to the extent that they concern common issues and
73. United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit is also moving toward the Second Circuit's restrictive interpretation of the joint de-
fense privilege and currently requires that the parties be engaged in an actual joint defense
strategy. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 701 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying McPartlin, but
finding no joint defense privilege because the communications at issue were not made in
confidence).
74. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990).
75. Id. at 246; see also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Sweeney, 29 F.3d 120, 124-25
(4th Cir. 1994) (indicating that a defendant's belief that he shared a common interest with
another party would not suffice to invoke the common interest privilege).
76. See United States v. Montgomery, 990 F.2d 1264, 1993 WL 74314 (9th Cir. Mar. 15,
1993) (unpublished); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965); see also
United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the defendant need
not show that the party with whom he allegedly shared a "common interest" faced any
immediate liability; a shared interest in "sorting out ... affairs" was sufficient), vacated in
part on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988).
77. Montgomery, 1993 WL 74314, at *4.
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are intended to facilitate representation in possible subse-
quent proceedings.8
Another Ninth Circuit case highlights the expansiveness of this
prior holding, noting that while the "paradigm case [of joint de-
fense privilege] is where two or more persons subject to possible
indictment arising from the same transaction make confidential
statements that are exchanged among their attorneys," the privi-
lege is not limited to such a case.79 Indeed, "[e]ven where the non-
party who is privy to the attorney-client communications has
never been sued on the matter of common interest and faces no
immediate liability, it can still be found to have a common interest
with the party seeking to protect the communications.8 0
With regard to the existence of a joint defense privilege as it
pertains to documents and not just oral communications, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that for a privilege
to apply to documents, the party invoking the privilege must es-
tablish that "(1) the documents were made in the course of a joint-
defense effort; and (2) the documents were designed to further
that effort."8'
In sum, although courts tend to impose different requirements
before validating a joint defense agreement, courts nonetheless
recognize the importance of, and generally uphold, such agree-
ments. The agreements, however, still make prosecutors "un-
easy."82 Indeed, commentators suggest that prosecutors disfavor
the use of joint defense agreements because they fear that the co-
operation and confidentiality amongst defendants inherent in a
joint defense agreement will shield pertinent evidence and hinder
the government's ability to get convictions because it will be more
difficult for prosecutors to isolate individuals.83 Moreover, prose-
78. Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 185.
79. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417.
80. Id.
81. Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 1998);
see also Chepiga, supra note 33, at 586. In fact, one court has held that the privilege was
not waived where an attorney shared his work product with another attorney representing
a different client with a common interest, but not involved in the same litigation. Chepiga,
supra, at 586-87 (citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Of
course, transferring documents to another party's attorney under a joint defense agreement
does not work to extend the privilege if the protection did not apply before the transfer. Id.
at 588 (citing Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621, 624 (E.D. Tex.
1993)).
82. Savarese & Miller, supra note 33, at 720.
83. Chepiga, supra note 33, at 591; Bartel, supra note 33, at 879.
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cutors worry that joint defense agreements "may include unlawful
efforts to impede justice, provide a group of co-defendants with the
opportunity to influence improperly the memories of witnesses, or
otherwise permit a concerted attempt to obstruct grand jury inves-
tigations."4 Prosecutors also express concern that the joint de-
fense privilege enables the continuation of criminal conspiracies. 5
During the past two decades, as the Justice Department prose-
cuted corporations with increasing frequency, it began to discour-
age the use of joint defense agreements. In 1991, the Justice De-
partment outwardly expressed its suspicion of such agreements in
an article published in "The DOJ Alert," which reported, "a select
group of DOJ's senior white-collar prosecutors has launched a sys-
tematic survey of the nation's U.S. attorneys to gauge their views
on joint defense agreements."' The then chief of the Criminal Di-
vision's Fraud Section also noted in the article that "[p]rosecutors
are uneasy ...because they see in [joint defense agreements],
even unintentionally, an opportunity to get together and shape
testimony."" Yet, despite this uneasiness, prosecutors were still
cautioned in the article against having a "knee-jerk reaction"
against joint defense agreements and were directed to focus in-
stead on the investigation, unless there was a "specific reason to
believe the agreement [was] being used for improper purposes. 8
The Justice Department's view of joint defense agreements is
consistent with the notion of cooperation found in the Organiza-
tional Sentencing chapter of the federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Corporate Sentencing Guidelines").89 The Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, which became effective in November 1991, aid federal
prosecutors in determining whether a target for prosecution
should receive a more lenient sentence based on the quality of the
cooperation with the government. Under the Corporate Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, corporations receive a more lenient sentence if
they disclose the violation prior to an "imminent threat" of disclo-
sure or if they "fully cooperate" with the government investiga-
tion.9° The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines require that the co-
84. Bartel, supra note 33, at 879 (citation omitted).
85. Id.
86. White-Collar Prosecutors Probe Joint Defense Agreements, 1 THE DOJ ALERT 3, July
1991 [hereinafter "DOJ ALERT"].
87. Id. (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Savarese & Miller,
supra note 33, at 720.
88. DOJ ALERT, supra note 86, at 3.
89. U.S.S.G. ch. 8.
90. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1), (2).
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operation be "timely" and "thorough."9 "Thorough" cooperation
requires the corporation to provide pertinent information "suffi-
cient for law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and the
extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the
criminal conduct."92 In applying the Corporate Sentencing Guide-
lines, prosecutors have interpreted "cooperate" broadly and
pressed corporations to disclose privileged information in order to
receive credit for cooperating.93 Therefore, the Justice Depart-
ment's uneasiness with joint defense agreements reflects the fact
that these agreements are perceived as inherently uncooperative
since they seek to benefit the parties, while hindering the free flow
of information to the government if one party seeks to cooperate
under the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines. (In fact, that percep-
tion is exaggerated since the agreements hinder the flow only of
privileged information which, but for the agreement, the recipient
would not have.)
It is unclear whether the Holder Memo Standards, when first
issued, were meant merely to clarify the Justice Department's
view of joint defense agreements or whether they were meant as a
warning to attorneys that pressure on corporations to waive privi-
lege to receive credit for cooperating will increase, thereby indicat-
ing that joint defense agreements that undermine this cooperation
would not be viewed favorably.94 A former Assistant Attorney
General, however, has denied that the Justice Department re-
quires corporations to waive privilege in order to receive the bene-
fits of cooperation.9' "There certainly is no department policy re-
quiring companies to waive the attorney-client privilege to receive
credit for cooperating with the government . . . [and] I, for one
would be opposed to [such a] policy."96 But, this same former Jus-
tice Department official also noted that it "should not be surpris-
91. Id. § 8C2.5(g), cmt. 12.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 148. One former United States At-
torney described this cooperation as an "enforced partnership" between prosecutors and
corporations, declaring it the best route to compliance with the law. Id. (citing Otto G.
Obermaier, Drafting Companies to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at 11). Legal
commentators have documented how this "enforced partnership" conflicts with Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that the best
route to corporate compliance with the law is "full and frank communication between at-
torneys and their clients." See, e.g., Zornow & Krakaur, supra, at 148-49.
94. See generally Polkes & Jarusinsky, supra note 2.
95. Irvin B. Nathan, Assistant Attorney General James Robinson Speaks to White Col-
lar Criminal Issues, 6 No. 12 Bus. CRIMES BULL. 3 (Jan. 2000).
96. Id.
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ing" that prosecutors will continue "to give greater consideration
to a corporation which cooperates extensively and provides sub-
stantial assistance" to the government, and stated:
I should fully disclose that when I was doing white collar
criminal defense work, I certainly participated in joint de-
fense agreements and recognized their value. On the other
hand, their value has to be balanced because there is the po-
tential for mischief and the potential for utilizing the agree-
ments to allow targets to circle the wagons and make it diffi-
cult for prosecutors successfully to complete an investigation
or prosecution. That is, of course, why these agreements are
viewed by some investigators and prosecutors as potential ve-
hicles to obstruct a successful investigation and prosecution.97
While the Holder Memo Standards and this former Justice De-
partment official's comments outwardly seem to suggest some Jus-
tice Department suspicion of joint defense agreements, the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York has
been more explicit in its disapproval of the use of joint defense
agreements for at least a decade. In cases where individual em-
ployees have entered into joint defense agreements with a target
corporation:
[T]he office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York routinely coerces corporate waivers of
the privilege by informing corporate managers that their fail-
ure to waive the privilege will be evaluated in determining
whether the corporation has been sufficiently cooperative to
avoid indictment and/or a severe guidelines sentence.98
Indeed, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York "has publicly called for a complete waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege by all corporate targets wishing to obtain
credit for their cooperation."99 Accordingly, both corporations and
individual employees need to take this hostility towards joint de-
97. Id.
98. Robert Morvillo, The Decline of the Attorney Client Privilege, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1997,
at 3.
99. Judson W. Starr & Brian L. Flack, The Government's Insistence on a Waiver of
Privilege, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2001 J-1, at J-4 (ABA 2001); see also Polkes & Jarusinsky,
supra note 2, at J-31 (noting that beginning in the early 1990s, the United States Attor-
ney's Office for the Southern District of New York began transgressing former standards
for corporate cooperation).
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fense agreements into account prior to formalizing such agree-
ments.
In addition, the Government view, as expressed in the guide-
lines and elsewhere, sees all joint defense agreements as similar
while in fact they differ greatly from full disclosure of client com-
munications to providing corporate documents and explanation of
the corporate structure and process.
It has been suggested, however, that, despite the apparent lack
of clarity as to the government's position regarding joint defense
agreements, the Justice Department's stance may actually be re-
laxing. The American Bar Association ("ABA") a few years ago
held a session addressing attacks on the joint defense privilege,..
and a lawyer who spoke at the session commented that several
years ago the Justice Department saw joint defense agreements
mainly as a "mechanism simply to obstruct justice," but that
"[t]hrough education, the [Justice] Department has come to see
that these agreements are simply a way for defense counsel to le-
gitimately preserve privileges while sharing information."'' It
was further noted that the federal prosecutor who has a negative
"knee-jerk" reaction against joint defense agreements has become
"the exception rather than the rule."' 2 If this is in fact the case,
this positive development needs to be further supported by Justice
Department policies and guidelines.
C. Advancement of Attorneys' Fees
Defense counsel and their clients increasingly find government
resistance to corporate efforts to advancing attorneys' fees to indi-
vidual employees once a government investigation has been com-
menced. Although individuals under investigation or charged by
the government are entitled to obtain qualified, independent
counsel without interference from the government, federal prose-
cutors frequently object to a corporation providing counsel for its
employees and penalizes the company for not cooperating with the
government investigation. This federal government policy, how-
100. The session was entitled "Assault on the Privilege: Protecting and Defending the
Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Joint Defense Agreements in Criminal Inves-
tigation." Interview with Jan Handzlik, Kirkland & Ellis and Vincent J. Marella, Bird,
Marella, Boxer & Wolpert, Los Angeles, California, 13 CORP. CRIME REP. 12 (1999).
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id.
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ever, undermines a well-established and necessary practice and
imposes itself where law enforcement has no real interest.
In recognition that "[t]he sort of litigation in which corporate
executives are involved ... is likely to be protracted, complex, and
expensive,"' ° the vast majority of states have enacted statutes
that expressly authorize corporations to adopt provisions within
the company's bylaws, articles of incorporation, or employment
contracts that automatically provide for the advancement of legal
fees of officers and directors.0 4 Given today's litigious environ-
ment, many corporations have adopted such provisions.0 5 Since
these bylaws, articles, and employment agreements are enforce-
able contracts, corporations that refuse to advance the fees to di-
rectors and officers in accordance with the agreements face de-
claratory judgments and damages verdicts.' 6
For example, Delaware's code extends the scope of this author-
ity allowing for the adoption of mandatory advancement provi-
sions to include employees, as well as directors and officers. 7 Al-
though some corporations have bound themselves to advance fees
to employees pursuant to a bylaw or merger agreement,' 8 the far
more common practice is for corporations to adopt provisions that
provide the corporation with discretion to advance fees to employ-
ees:
Under bylaws, articles of incorporation, or other contractual
provisions, a corporation may provide for advancement of ex-
penses, including attorneys' fees. The corporation may agree
to make such advancements mandatory .... The provisions
in bylaws and articles of incorporation dealing with indemni-
103. JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS -
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6.27, at 45 (Gail A. O'Gradney ed., 2000).
104. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANNOTATED
§ 8.58(a) (3d. ed. Supp. 1998/99) [hereinafter "MBCA"]. Some state statutes directly require
a corporation to advance fees. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.083(3) (West 2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-91(4) (1999).
105. See 1 RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 145.7, at 237 (4th ed. Supp. 2000-1) ("Mandatory advancement provisions frequently
appear in corporate charters, by-laws, and indemnification agreements.").
106. Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that officer is enti-
tled to injunction requiring corporation to advance fees prior to final disposition of the
claim); Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992) (awarding damages and
prejudgment interest to director after corporation refused to advance fees as mandated in
employment agreement).
107. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f).
108. Ridder, 47 F.3d at 86-87 (indicating bylaw required advancement of expenses to all
employees).
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fication all cover directors and officers, and a substantial mi-
nority apply also to "employees" and "agents," even if the
statute does not .... But... , most of those that cover em-
ployees provide that the corporation "may" indemnify employ-
109
ees ....
A discretionary fee advancement provision allows the corpora-
tion's board of directors to assess the circumstances underlying an
employee's need for separate counsel (and a concomitant need for
fees to be paid in advance) and render a decision that is subject to
a reasonableness requirement." ° Typically, the corporations that
adopt such discretionary provisions will require the employee to
provide a written affirmation of good faith or an undertaking to
repay the fees if he or she is later found to be ineligible for indem-
nification."'
Significantly, Delaware's corporate code and the codes of many
other states expressly permit this discretionary advancement of
fees to employees."' The Model Business Corporation Act, which
endeavors to leave unregulated the issue of advancement of ex-
penses to employees, similarly acknowledges that its provisions
are "not in any way intended to cast doubt on the power of the
corporation to indemnify or advance expenses to ...employees
and agents .. .
In addition to the state corporation codes, legal ethics rules also
permit a corporation to pay an employee's attorney's fees, provided
that the attorney maintains professional independence and loyalty
to the employee. For example, Model Rule 1.8(f) of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") requires a lawyer
who accepts compensation from a third party to take steps to en-
sure no conflict of interest exists:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a cli-
ent from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
and
109. BISHOP, supra note 103, §§ 7.07.50 to 7.08, at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
110. Citadel Holding, 603 A.2d 823-24.
ill. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 103, App. 7A, at 5-8 (reprinting resolution that confers
the discretion to advance fees to an employee and agent if an undertaking is provided on
his or her behalf).
112. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f).
113. MBCA § 8.58(e) & cmt.
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(3) information relating to representation of a client is pro-
tected as required by Rule 1.6.114
The ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice contain a comparable
direction:
In accepting payment of fees by one person for the defense of
another, defense counsel should be careful to determine that
he or she will not be confronted with a conflict of loyalty since
defense counsel's entire loyalty is due the accused. Defense
counsel should not accept such compensation unless:
(i) the accused consents after disclosure;
(ii) there is no interference with defense counsel's independ-
ence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer rela-
tionship; and
(iii) information relating to the representation of the accused
is protected from disclosure as required by defense counsel's
ethical obligation of confidentiality.
Defense counsel should not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays defense counsel to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate counsel's professional judgment
in rendering such legal services."'
Accordingly, the exercise of discretion by a corporation to ad-
vance fees on behalf of an employee is permitted by law and ethi-
cal codes. Corporations that exercise this discretion are guided by
a legitimate concern for employee morale as well as the view that
it is unfair to require an employee whose corporate conduct is un-
der investigation to pay for their own defense before any adjudica-
tion of guilt, much less before any determination of guilt or re-
sponsibility on the part of the individual could even be made.
Moreover, the principles underlying the advancement of expenses
to directors and officers - i.e., that those who serve the corporation
should not be forced to bear the expense of their own defense, as
that would discourage competent people from serving in such ca-
pacity - apply equally to a corporation's decision to advance fees to
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (1999). Rule 1.8(f) is very similar to its
predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 5-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which is still in force in some states.
115. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.5(e) (1993). If the lawyer
could not exercise independence, such as in a "crime family" case, the court may order dis-
qualification. See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1993).
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employees."6 Therefore, the exercise of discretion to advance fees
typically reflects sound corporate governance goals, rather than an
effort to not cooperate with a government investigation.
The legitimacy of the policy goals espoused by these state stat-
utes and ethical standards is confirmed by the Justice Depart-
ment's own internal regulations, which permit the Justice De-
partment itself to pay for a prosecutor's outside counsel if the
prosecutor is a subject of a federal criminal investigation."7 Un-
fortunately, the guidance recently issued to federal prosecutors in
the Holder Memo Standards could, and does, generate interfer-
ence with the principle that non-government employees facing
government investigation or prosecution are entitled to qualified,
competent representation. Today, it is common for defense coun-
sel to be confronted by a federal prosecutor who believes that a
corporation is not fully cooperating with the government in a fed-
eral criminal investigation solely because the corporation is pay-
ing the legal fees for an officer, director or employee.
Although the Holder Memo Standards quite logically instruct
prosecutors that the cooperation of the corporation may be a rele-
vant factor in determining whether to charge the company, this
guidance includes flawed commentary that authorizes a prosecu-
tor to view as non-cooperative the advancement of legal fees for
employees that have been deemed "culpable" by the prosecutor.
Specifically, the Holder Memo Standards state that:
[W]hile cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a
corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and
agents, either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through
retaining the employees without sanction for their miscon-
duct, or through providing information to the employees about
the government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense
agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing
the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation."'
A footnote, fortunately, does add that "[s]ome states require cor-
porations to pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior
to a formal determination of their guilt. Obviously, a corporation's
116. See MBCA § 8.58 & cmt (recognizing that the authority also exists for corporations
to indemnify or advance fees to employees).
117. 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15(a)(7), 50.16.
118. Criminal Resource Manual, art. 162, § VI.B (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Section VI.B. contains numerous other relevant provisions as well.
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compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure
to cooperate."119 But where this state requirement is lacking, the
Holder Memo Standards undermine an otherwise legal, ethical
and useful practice.
The Justice Department policy expressed in the Holder Memo
Standards may unfairly prejudice corporations and their employ-
ees and thus, compromise the administration of justice. Although
corporations are often obligated under state law and their by-laws
to advance fees to officers and directors, they may have statutory
authority not to pay attorneys' fees for officers and directors if the
corporation determines that an officer or director acted with
criminal intent or acted to harm the company.2 ° In addition,
corporations typically retain discretion to advance fees for lower-
ranking employees. Since a decision to advance fees most often
must be made long before there is a sufficient factual basis to al-
low a corporation to assess "culpability" of the employee, the
Holder Memo Standards may cause premature judgments by a
corporation about an employee's criminal intent and conduct and
will have a chilling effect on a corporation's exercise of discretion
to advance fees.
In addition, the Holder Memo Standards are subject to abuse by
prosecutors who could gain a strategic advantage by interfering
with the ability of corporate employees to retain competent coun-
sel if they are unable to do so absent financial support from the
company.
The purported application of the Holder Memo Standards to the
advancement of fees only to "culpable" employees creates a para-
digm that is both incompatible with the legal standards governing
advancement and impractical in its application to white-collar
criminal investigations. Culpability may play a role in a corpora-
tion's decision whether to ultimately indemnify an employee, as
the corporation may choose not to indemnify an employee who
acted in bad faith or with reason to believe that his or her conduct
was unlawful. 2' Whether an employee is guilty of the offense for
which he or she is under investigation, however, frequently cannot
be determined by a corporation at the investigation or pre-trial
stage. Indeed, the ultimate decision to not indemnify an employee
119. Id. at n.3.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2000).
121. Id. § 145(a)-(b).
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is often made long after the need to do so has arisen and fees have
already been advanced.
Under Delaware law, for example, a corporation's decision to
advance fees is an issue resolved independently of the employee's
ultimate entitlement to indemnification, and is instead resolved
by answering questions that do not touch upon culpability.'22 In
general, courts applying Delaware law will first determine
whether the employee is entitled to the advancement of fees by
virtue of a bylaw, resolution, or contractual provision.' If not, the
decision to advance fees is left to the discretion of the corporation
and the sole requirement that must be fulfilled is for the employee
to file an undertaking to repay the advanced fees if such an under-
taking is required by the relevant bylaw, resolution, or contract.
124
In contrast, the Holder Memo Standards would require a corpo-
ration to determine an employee's "culpability" well before such a
determination is ripe. As noted by one state legislature, "during
the early stages of a proceeding (when advances are often needed)
the facts underlying the claim cannot be fully evaluated and the
board of directors therefore cannot accurately ascertain the ulti-
mate propriety of indemnification."1 2' This is particularly the case
in corporate criminal investigations, where the proscribed behav-
ior "is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially
acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct." 26  As
summarized by one commentator, "[t]he jurisprudence of white
collar crime, in particular, is littered with examples of courts and
legislatures struggling to clarify what is or is not a crime."27
In light of this uncertain legal backdrop and the large volume of
documents that typically must be reviewed in corporate investiga-
tions, a company will often be unable to realistically assess the
culpability of its employees until the conclusion of the legal pro-
ceedings. In the case where an employee has made a serious mis-
122. Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Under Delaware law,
appellants' right to receive the costs of defense in advance does not depend upon the merits
of the claims asserted against them and is separate and distinct from any right of indemni-
fication they may later be able to establish.").
123. Id.
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e).
125. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-530 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 2000).
126. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978); see also Pamela H.
Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An
Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279, 293 (1991) (concluding that many white-
collar criminal statutes and regulations create a "gray area between legal and illegal con-
duct").
127. Bucy, supra note 126, at 293.
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take in judgment, the company may not have sufficient informa-
tion to conclude that the employee had the necessary criminal in-
tent. In most United States corporations, a basic tenet of human
resources management is that an employee should be given the
benefit of the doubt when determining something as serious as
whether he or she acted with criminal intent. As a result, compa-
nies often properly refrain from premature determinations regard-
ing an employee's criminal culpability. The Holder Memo Stan-
dards, however, unwisely pressures a company to rush to judg-
ment.
In addition, the guidance set forth in the Holder Memo Stan-
dards is subject to abuse. Every lawyer - including a prosecutor -
has an obligation not to interfere with an individual's legal repre-
sentation, particularly in a criminal matter.2 ' As Model Rule 8.4
states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' " 9 Al-
though the paramount duty of a prosecutor is to seek justice, 8 ' the
Holder Memo Standards unfortunately create a framework that
allows a prosecutor to use his or her leverage to interfere with an
employee's ability to obtain a well-qualified lawyer, which in fact
undermines the interests of justice.
Given that most business-related investigations concern com-
plex regulatory issues, an experienced attorney is frequently nec-
essary to competently safeguard an employee's interests. Many
employees, however, lack sufficient funds to retain such an attor-
ney. An employee who is denied the advancement of fees is
unlikely to be able to obtain competent counsel. This reasoning
applies with equal - if not greater - force to low-ranking employ-
ees. Prosecutors may gain a strategic advantage by chilling a
company's exercise of discretion to advance fees for employees and
impeding an employee's ability to retain a capable and experi-
enced attorney. Such strategic interference with an individual's
ability to obtain representation is inconsistent with the ethical
128. Under the McDade Amendment adopted in 1998, federal prosecutors are subject to
state ethics rules and local federal court rules governing attorneys in each state where such
attorney engages in that attorney's duties. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1999).
130. "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).
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standards governing attorney conduct and ultimately impedes the
fair administration of justice."'
D. Crime-Fraud Exception
Today, defense lawyers are confronted by government efforts to
overcome the attorney-client privilege by assertion of the crime-
fraud exception. A defense counsel's first notice of such a claim is
often in an ex parte order of a court requiring the lawyer to pro-
vide testimony regarding communications with a client.
Although the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege is as universally recognized as the privilege itself, it is justi-
fied only on the grounds that the traditional rationale for the
privilege - attorneys may give sound legal advice only if clients
can fully and frankly communicate with them - does not apply
when the intent of the communications is to further criminal ac-
tivity."2 The crime-fraud exception to the privilege dates back to
the 1743 English case of Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea."33 A later
English case, Regina v. Cox, was the first to give widespread effect
to the exception, applying it to both civil and criminal wrongs in
1884.1 4 Regina established the principle that the client's intent in
consulting an attorney controls whether the communication is
privileged, holding, "[i]n order that the rule may apply there must
be both professional confidence and professional employment, but
if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications
with his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be ab-
sent."'3
In the 1891 case of Alexander v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court endorsed the Regina rule, but added the
limitation that the exception should only apply to wrongs for
131. The Holder Memo Standards' guidance regarding advancement of attorney's fees is
also incompatible and inconsistent with the apparent approval of this practice as expressed
in state statutes permitting corporations to exercise discretion to advance fees, despite the
exemption in the Justice Department guidelines when such advances are required by law.
132. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992); Coleman v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 106
F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985).
133. 17 How. St. Tr. 1225 (1743), quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291; see also
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 87, at 344 n.3 (citing Annesley); Fried, supra
note 9, at 446-50 (discussing the history and significance of Annesley).
134. 14 Q.B.D. 153 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1884); see also Christopher Paul Galanek, Note, The
Impact of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1123 (1990) (discussing Regina).
135. 14 Q.B.D. at 168; see also Galanek, supra note 134, at 1123 n.45 (quoting Regina).
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which the party is currently being tried.' This restriction, how-
ever, has since become a dead letter.17 The Court further refined
the crime-fraud exception in Clark v. United States by limiting its
application to cases in which the party opposing the privilege had
presented "prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in
fact.""8 Another early limitation to the exception was the "inde-
pendent evidence" requirement, whereby the government was re-
quired to establish its prima facie case through evidence acquired
independently of the communications at issue.9 Yet, since prose-
cutors invoked it relatively infrequently, the crime-fraud exception
remained an undeveloped doctrine throughout much of this cen-
tury.
More recently, federal prosecutors have taken advantage of the
increased criminalization of white-collar and regulatory offenses
to invade the attorney-client privilege by asserting the crime-
fraud exception. 40 Such government efforts have a low procedural
threshold, allowing prosecutors to compel testimony about attor-
ney-client communications based only on an ex parte showing that
the exception applies. In most cases, the decision to proceed and
the ex parte showing to the court are both made by the individual
prosecutor handling the investigation without any additional re-
view or approval within the Justice Department.
Most courts recognize that in order for the exception to apply,
prosecutors must demonstrate two elements: (1) the client was
involved in planning criminal conduct at the time of the consulta-
tion; and (2) the attorney's assistance was obtained in furtherance
of this activity.' It is the client's subjective intent, and not the
attorney's knowledge of the planned criminal activity, that con-
136. 138 U.S. 353, 360 (1891); see also Fried, supra note 9, at 460.
137. Fried, supra note 9, at 460.
138. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (internal quotation omitted); see also Fried, supra note 9, at
462-63.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Fried, supra note 9, at 463-65. This limita-
tion has since been abrogated by United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), discussed
infra.
140. Fried, supra note 9, at 470.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 321 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381.
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trols. 42 In most federal Circuits, the exception applies even if the
client never completed the planned crime or fraud.
143
The minimal prima facie ex parte showing required of prosecu-
tors underlies the current concern regarding the government's
efforts to use the crime-fraud exception. The Supreme Court has
addressed this issue only once, in United States v. Zolin, a case in
which the IRS sought to compel the defendant in a criminal tax
investigation to produce various documents and audiotapes that
the defendant claimed were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.'" The IRS submitted statements from agents working on the
case, as well as partial transcripts of the tape recordings obtained
from a confidential source, to demonstrate that the crime-fraud
exception applied. The district court refused to conduct an in
camera review of the privileged material, but ordered that the de-
fendant produce five of the requested documents based on the
prosecutor's evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
45
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that a court
can review privileged material in camera to determine whether
the exception applies. To obtain an in camera review, the party
opposing the privilege "must present evidence sufficient to support
a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield evidence that
establishes the exception's applicability." 46 Disposing of the tradi-
tional "independent evidence" requirement, the Court held that
any relevant evidence that was lawfully obtained and not privi-
leged could be used to make this threshold showing.'47 Further-
more, the decision whether to grant the in camera review is within
the district court's discretion.'
The Zolin Court declined to define the quantum of proof ulti-
mately necessary to invoke the crime-fraud exception following
the in camera review. 149 Most federal courts, however, continue to
apply the Clark prima facie standard when deciding whether the
142. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 87 F.3d at 381-82; United States v. Chen, 99
F.3d 1495, 1504 (9th Cir. 1996).
143. See, e.g., Collis, 128 F.3d at 321; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984). But see In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46,
49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he client must have carried out the crime or fraud .... [T]he excep-
tion does not apply even though, at one time, the client had bad intentions.").
144. 491 U.S. 554, 557 (1989).
145. Id. at 558-61.
146. Id. at 574-75.
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id. at 572.
149. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563.
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exception applies. Although various Circuits have different for-
mulations of what constitutes a prima facie case, none of the stan-
dards are very stringent.
150
In applying Zolin, Circuits have generally required that prose-
cutors either make an ex parte showing to meet the threshold for
an in camera review or establish a prima facie case. According to
the Ninth Circuit, Zolin does not require that a court consider
"other available evidence" outside of what the prosecutor presents
to it in determining whether the exception applies.15 ' In an in
camera review of privileged statements, a defendant asserting the
privilege also has no right to notice or opportunity to be heard.
Instead, the "prima facie foundation may be made by documentary
evidence or good faith statements by the prosecutor as to testi-
mony already received by the grand jury." "' For example, in one
case, the government subpoenaed defense counsel for a hospital
that was the target of a grand jury investigation and, in arguing
that the crime-fraud exception applied to counsel's testimony,
prosecutors submitted an in camera, ex parte "good faith" state-
ment of evidence about the alleged criminal activity. The district
court ruled that the government had established a prima facie
case and refused to allow the hospital's counsel to view the gov-
ernment's evidence or to present rebuttal evidence. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, holding that instead of affording an opportunity
to be heard, the court need only protect the privileged communica-
tion by defining the "scope of the crime-fraud exception narrowly
150. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 at 96 (indicating that all that may be
required is "evidence which, if believed by the fact finder, supports plaintiffs theory of
fraud"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 857 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
partial transcript of grand jury proceedings and affidavits established prima facie case that
documents were not privileged, because the evidence showed that the allegation of attorney
participation in a crime or fraud has some foundation in fact); In re Int'l Sys. & Controls
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) (endorsing Black's Law Dictionary
definition of prima facie case - evidence that "will suffice until contradicted and overcome
by other evidence" - and finding that mere allegations in plaintiffs pleadings did not meet
this standard).
151. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1994). In Zolin, the
government sought documents relating to the defendant corporations' allegedly illegal
exports and presented affidavits from former employees to demonstrate that the exception
applied. The district court found the government's evidence sufficient to obtain an in cam-
era review of the documents and declined to consider countervailing evidence from the
corporation. 491 U.S. at 573-74.
152. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 662 (10th Cir. 1998).
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enough so that information outside of the exception will not be
elicited."5 3
Courts' willingness to rely on a prima facie, ex parte showing to
establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception likely
stems from dual concerns. First, that a determination of this
foundational issue will become a "preliminary minitrial" and
waste judicial resources.' Second, in the context of grand jury
proceedings, that the government's interest in protecting the se-
crecy of the proceedings outweighs a defendant's due process
rights.'- Although the increasing use of the crime-fraud exception
stems in large part from the courts' willingness to find it applies,
the detrimental effect of this development is greatly exacerbated
by the efforts of federal prosecutors to invoke the exception, often
in ex parte proceedings.
The United States Attorneys' Manual contains no specific guide-
lines regarding the invocation of the crime-fraud exception by fed-
eral prosecutors. Despite the warnings against invading the at-
torney-client relationship, federal prosecutors have increasingly
invoked the crime-fraud exception to compel testimony about
privileged communications. One review of reported case law in
the mid-1980's alone indicated an "extraordinary increase" in at-
tempts to compel attorney testimony throughout the previous
twenty years. Invocations of the exception "proliferate" in the
context of federal grand juries."7 Federal prosecutors' use of sub-
poenas for lawyers have been described as a "growing trend ...
153. Id. at 661. But see Haines, 975 F.2d at 97 ("The importance of the privilege ... as
well as fundamental concepts of due process require that the party defending the privilege
be given the opportunity to be heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking an
exception to the privilege."). The Third Circuit, however, eventually distinguished Haines
and held that relying solely on an ex parte affidavit to determine the application of the
crime-fraud exception does not violate due process. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d
213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000) ("This case differs from Haines not only because Haines was a civil
case and this is a criminal one but, even more important, because Haines involved adver-
sarial proceedings whereas grand jury proceedings are investigative, and the rules of the
game are different.").
154. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 857 F.2d at 712 (expressing such concern);
see also H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 KY. L.J. 1191, 1259 (1999) (discussing courts' con-
cerns).
155. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
that in camera review of the government's evidence did not violate defendant's due process
rights); see also Brown, supra note 154, at 1259 (discussing these secrecy concerns).
156. Fried, supra note 9, at 445 (citing a review of the case digests).
157. Ann M. St. Peter-Griffith, Abusing the Privilege: The Crime-Fraud Exception to
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 259, 279 (1993).
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[that] has troubled both practitioners and legal scholars.""8 This
trend can be at least partially explained by the increase in crimi-
nalization of regulatory offenses and in federal prosecutions for
white collar and organized crime.1 9
Although federal prosecutors are increasingly using the crime-
fraud exception to overcome the attorney-client privilege, the evi-
dence presented by prosecutors to make a prima facie case is often
not disclosed in court opinions, thus making an analysis of the full
extent of the problem difficult. Nonetheless, the current Justice
Department practices that jeopardize the privilege and undermine
the policies behind it include: (1) using unsubstantiated state-
ments to establish the application of the exception; (2) utilizing
communications outside the bounds of the exception; and (3) not
following the proper procedures for the introduction of privileged
evidence.
As various legal scholars have commented, there are significant
consequences arising from the Justice Department's increased re-
liance on the crime-fraud exception, particularly because of the
potential for prosecutorial abuse inherent in the law pertaining to
the exception itself. The most common criticisms are the aban-
donment of the "independent evidence" requirement, the lack of
restrictions on the legitimacy and accuracy of evidence, and the ex
parte nature of the proceeding. The current rules allow prosecu-
tors to obtain an in camera review based on unsubstantiated in-
formation that they may have collected through an unlawful in-
trusion into the privilege, without giving defendants an opportu-
nity to challenge the reliability or validity of that evidence.16 °
Safeguards are necessary even during an in camera review be-
cause "each time a court entertains a motion to defeat the privi-
lege with any information, qualitatively acceptable or not, the
court risks disclosing privileged information that should not be
disclosed to any party."16 In addressing the ex parte nature of the
in camera review, this process has also come under attack by
commentators who criticize its inherent weaknesses:
158. Ross G. Greenberg et al., Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime Procedural Issues:
Attorney-Client Privilege, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (1993).
159. Fried, supra note 9, at 445.
160. See Brown, supra note 154, at 1252; St. Peter-Griffith, supra note 158, at 269-71;
Galanek, supra note 134, at 1139-40 (each noting these concerns).
161. St. Peter-Griffith, supra note 157, at 271.
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The absence of notice of the basis of the crime-fraud claim fur-
ther aggravates the inability of the privilege holder to mean-
ingfully respond and to preserve the privilege. The court is
also deprived of the robust factual development and legal ar-
gument necessary for an informed judicial decision."
Oftentimes, the evidence that prosecutors use either to obtain
an in camera review or to establish a prima facie case contains no
indicia of reliability or derives from third parties with an interest
in the matter. For example, in one case, the government relied on
affidavits from two former employees of the defendant corporation
to meet the threshold for an in camera review of documents it
claimed were in furtherance of export control violations.'63 Both
employees' affidavits contained hearsay evidence about specific
words and acts of the company's executives:
According to one former employee, the Corporation's president
shipped GPS units to the [United Arab Emirates] in July
1989 and, a short time later, received a telex from Iran thank-
ing him for the units .... He further stated that both an Ira-
nian trainee and the Corporation's vice-president indicated
that the GPS units in Iran came from a [United Arab Emir-
ates] front company deliberately set up for that purpose.'6 4
In another case, the prosecutor used testimony from a government
agent that likely included hearsay to make its prima facie case."'
In both of these cases, the courts accepted the evidence and re-
voked the privilege. Furthermore, although the exception is sup-
posed to apply to communications that take place before an in-
tended crime or fraud is committed, federal prosecutors frequently
attempt to apply it to communications after the crime has oc-
curred.'66 Indeed, the district courts in two cases compelled pro-
duction of documents dated after the completion of the alleged
crime. Fortunately, the appellate courts reversed and limited the
lower courts' orders to evidence of communications before the
162. Brown, supra note 154, at 1259-60 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael M. Musto-
koff et al., The Attorney! Client Privilege: A Fond Memory of Things Past An Analysis of the
Privilege Following United States v. Anderson, 9 ANNALs HEALTH L. 107, 114-17 (2000)
(reflecting the current criticism of these practices).
163. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(&J), 31 F.3d at 830.
164. Id.
165. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d at 127.
166. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 31 F.3d at 831; In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d at 1041.
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crime occurred.'67 These efforts to use such evidence, however, is
alarming
Federal prosecutors have also attempted to circumvent the two-
step procedure outlined in Zolin. For example, in one case, the
prosecutor sought application of the exception, and the trial court
initially applied it to a letter to the defendant from his attorney.
Because the prosecutor did not establish a basis for an in camera
review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found this to be
error. ' In another Ninth Circuit case, a federal prosecutor relied
on disclosures of attorney-client communications from a former
employee of the defendant and from an agent's affidavit regarding
these communications, but without first requesting an in camera
review or making a prima facie showing."9
Federal prosecutors have also argued that attorney-client com-
munications can be evidence of a particular "crime" and are there-
fore not privileged, even if the facts of the case do not make out
the elements of the alleged crime. 7' Another "extraordinary ploy"
used by prosecutors is to turn a past offense into a continuing one
so that the communications fall within the exception. 7' For ex-
ample, in a Fifth Circuit case, following the defendant's indict-
ment for extortion, defense counsel wrote a letter to the alleged
victim enclosing the money allegedly extorted.'72 The prosecutor
then subpoenaed the attorney to testify about conversations that
occurred prior to the return of the money, which, according to the
prosecutor, acted as an obstruction of justice.'73
Last, while evidence about attorney-client communications can
take a variety of forms, prosecutors most often invoke the crime-
fraud exception in order to force attorneys to testify against their
167. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 31 F.3d at 831; In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
731 F.2d at 1041-42.
168. United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit
admitted the letter on other grounds, however, and, as a result, did not reverse the lower
court decision. Id. at 750.
169. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d at 1502. Although the evidence was admitted, the
lower court expressly stated that it had disregarded the privileged statements in ruling
that the crime-fraud exception applied to them. Id. at 1503-04.
170. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d at 1039-40 (stating that the court was
"skeptical" that defendant corporation's sale of its stock could be considered an obstruction
of justice or part of a conspiracy to defraud the United States, as the prosecutor had ar-
gued).
171. Fried, supra note 9, at 474.
172. United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Fried, supra note
9, at 474-75.
173. Dyer, 722 F.2d at 176; see also Fried, supra note 9, at 474-75.
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clients. 7 4 As a result, "opposing counsel could use the subpoena to
eliminate troublesome, qualified defense counsel" by compelling
an attorney to testify about the client's communications and
thereby forcing the subpoenaed attorney to withdraw as counsel.
7
1
It is particularly troubling when the government's use of this ex-
ception results in the lawyer being compelled to testify against his
or her client.
Because of the extraordinary impact this result necessarily has
on the attorney-client privilege and relationship, the government
should establish a level of review within the Justice Department
that would be required before the prosecutor could make such an
ex parte application to the Court.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The current Justice Department policies and practices regard-
ing the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
have significant negative consequences. By eroding the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine, they undermine de-
fense counsel's ability to effectively represent his or her client.
The values enshrined in these protections are deep-rooted and
broadly embraced by the entire legal community. As the Supreme
Court has stated:
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law ....
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and admini-
stration of justice.'
Rather than undermining and eroding the attorney-client privi-
lege and work product doctrine by viewing them as obstacles to
the legitimate prosecution of crimes, the Justice Department
should recognize that these protections provide the foundation for
a lawyer to offer an informed opinion and sound legal advice to a
client based upon full knowledge of the issue at hand, and play a
vital role in the American system of justice. Federal prosecutors
174. See, e.g., Mustokoff, supra note 162, at 110 (discussing a case in which this oc-
curred).
175. Greenberg, supra note 158, at 1022.
176. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citation omitted).
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should not exact a waiver of these important protections. The
Justice Department should modify and clarify its guidelines re-
garding the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine in order to ensure the fullest protection possible for these
fundamental principles of American law, while still allowing vig-
orous enforcement of the criminal statutes. The two are not in-
compatible.
Cooperation with the government in its investigation may be
full and complete without the coerced waiver of these protections.
The proliferation of a policy of prosecutorial coercion is, in the long
run, a disservice to the public interest and to the fair administra-
tion of justice. The waiver of the attorney-client and work product
privilege should only be made voluntarily and not as a result of
government coercion. And the government has a long standing
policy in conflict with seeking such waivers. The U.S. Attorney's
Manual requires that all reasonable attempts be made to obtain
the information from other sources and only when these efforts
have been unsuccessful, may a prosecutor serve a subpoena on an
attorney for testimony or documents, and then only after approval
of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Divi-
sion.177 There is no reason to abandon this policy.
The government has also weakened these protections by attack-
ing joint defense agreements. Joint defense agreements provide
the opportunity for defense attorneys to preserve the attorney-
client privilege and work product protections while sharing infor-
mation crucial to the preparation of an adequate defense. The
Justice Department policy regarding joint defense agreements,
however, appears to be in flux, leaving ample discretion to indi-
vidual prosecutors to develop their own policies and strategies.
Some prosecutors recognize the importance of a joint defense
agreement in order for a corporation's counsel to be able to obtain
adequate information to advise the corporate client and provide
accurate information to the government as well as its importance
for an individual employee. Other prosecutors, however, find the
existence of a joint defense agreement a basis for charging the
corporation with interfering with a government investigation.
This is an issue the Justice Department should clarify with a
statement of policy supporting a presumption that joint defense
agreements are valid unless there is substantial reason to believe
one is being used in an illegal manner. Prior to such a determina-
177. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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tion, the fact that a joint defense agreement exists should not be
used by the government as evidence of non-cooperation or obstruc-
tion on the part of a corporation.
With regard to the advancement of fees, it should be recognized
in the Justice Department guidelines that this practice is permit-
ted under state corporation law and ethical codes and is necessary
to enable employees to be adequately represented in a criminal
investigation of corporate conduct. The current Justice Depart-
ment guidelines discourage the legitimate advancement of fees
and permit prosecutors to abuse their authority and impose law
enforcement where it has no real interest in order to gain a stra-
tegic advantage and thereby deprive the employee of a funded de-
fense.
Finally, while developing case law has made it easy for prosecu-
tors to invoke the crime-fraud exception, and perhaps this is a
matter of concern best addressed to the courts, it is important that
Justice Department attorneys not seek to use every opportunity
available to them to invade the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine for the purpose of building a case when other
avenues are available. The government should make ex parte
claims that these protections have been breached by the crime-
fraud exception only after facts are established that fully support
that a challenge to the attorney-client privilege is warranted.
Such a challenge should not be merely an advocate's tool. Prose-
cutors must be mindful of the societal importance of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine and the dangers
that result from their erosion by excessive invocation of the crime-
fraud exception. The Justice Department should establish more
specific guidelines on compelling disclosure of attorney-client
communications or work product that stress strict compliance
with the few safeguards and limits that do exist in the law, par-
ticularly in regard to the ex parte showing that prosecutors must
make to invoke the crime-fraud exception.
Since courts will not customarily provide the party asserting the
privilege the opportunity to challenge the evidence establishing a
prima facie case, the Justice Department guidelines should assure
that the government's evidence originates from reliable, credible
sources without a personal interest in the matter. Any ex parte
application should first be approved by the Attorney General or
appropriately designated person following a review of the facts.
And prosecutors should not attempt to compel disclosure of com-
munications that do not relate directly to a planned crime.
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A. Specific Recommendations
In order to alleviate the concerns expressed in this report that
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine have
been and continue to be eroded in federal criminal investigations,
the College makes the following specific recommendations:.
e The policies and guidelines of the Justice Department should
reflect the critical importance of the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine and incorporate alternatives to circumvent-
ing them. The following proposed guideline should be incorpo-
rated into the Holder Memo Standards:
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are
essential to the American justice system and should not be di-
luted for the sake of expediting a prosecution. Prosecutors
should exhaust other alternatives to obtain information before
requesting that a corporation cooperate by waiving privilege.
* The current guidelines provide in part, as follows:
"In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the
prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to iden-
tify the culprits within the corporation, including senior ex-
ecutives, to make witnesses available to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation, and to waive the attorney-
client and work product privileges."
This should be changed to read:
In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the
prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to iden-
tify those within the corporation whom it is aware or becomes
aware have engaged in culpable wrong doing, including senior
executives, to make witnesses available and otherwise coop-
erate.
* The Justice Department, in assessing whether a corporation
is cooperative, should consider its refusal to disclose the results of
internal investigations by counsel or otherwise waive the attor-
ney-client and work product privilege only when evidence is un-
available from any other sources.
* With regard to joint defense agreements or payment of em-
ployees' legal fees, the guidelines should state:
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A corporation's promise of support to employees and agents,
either through advancing of legal fees or through providing
information to the employees about the government's investi-
gation pursuant to a joint defense agreement, should be con-
sidered by the prosecutor in weighing the value of a corpora-
tion's cooperation only if such support continues in an inap-
propriate manner after a determination of culpability or mis-
conduct on the part of an employee.
* The government should not attempt to breach the attorney-
client privilege and work product protections by an ex parte appli-
cation to the court claiming a crime-fraud exception to the privi-
leges without clearly establishing a solid factual basis that this
exception applies. The proposed guideline should state:
In every case in which a claim of crime-fraud is to be made to
a court for the purpose of voiding the attorney-client or work
product privilege, the application should be approved by the
Attorney General or an appropriately designated person
within the Justice Department following a review of the fac-
tual basis for such an application.
B. Conclusion
Any impediment to obtaining relevant information that is pre-
sented by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
is counterbalanced by the benefits these protections afford the
criminal justice system and society in general. While a prosecu-
tor's job may be rendered more difficult by a corporation's or its
attorney's invocation of a privilege, this is not a valid reason to
compromise the longstanding and important legal principles that
underlie the privilege. Despite the challenges that the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine may present to prosecu-
tors, the overall benefits make these protections indispensable and
deserving of preservation.
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine play a
central role in corporate governance. In order to fully comply with
the law, corporate employees must be able to seek the advice of
corporate and outside counsel. It is necessary for the communica-
tion between counsel and corporate employees to be privileged to
ensure an open and honest exchange of information. Any policy
that equates the assertion of the attorney-client privilege and
work product protections with non-cooperation or obstruction ig-
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nores the harmful consequences to proper corporate governance.
It is in society's interest to ensure that corporations have the
means to comply with often complicated and intricate regulations
and laws. Corporate officers and employees need to be assured
that what they reveal to corporate or outside counsel will not be
used against them at a later date.
Whether invoked by a corporation or an individual, the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are essential to
the due administration of the American criminal justice system.
Justice Department guidelines and prosecutorial standards should
be revised to reflect adequately the central importance of these
protections.
